The jurisdictional conflicts in the South China Sea have claimed the attention of scholars as much as governments. Analyses abound, as do suggested solutions. These latter range from arrangements based on (the authorial view) of the realpolitik of the situation to accommodations which would favour one side or the other. All this despite a certain vagueness concerning the essentials of the situation, which include: the nature and extent of the claims officially promulgated or stated by the parties; the 'rules of the game' applicable to the South China Sea; the nature and extent of living or non-living resources of the sea, seabed, and sub-soil; the use-patterns of the littoral and non-littoral states and their nationals, and so on. Instead, many of these facts or factors are blurred, obscured, badly understood, ignored, or simply fabricated. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that some of the solutions advanced are more appropriate to lecture halls than inter-governmental debate.
So, what is to be done? Maritime jurisdictional conflicts have been a constant feature of claims to offshore areas: they have been with us for centuries, and seem likely to remain a feature of international ocean affairs for the foreseeable future. What distinguishes the situation in the South China Sea from other marine areas is the implacable nature of the conflict between the parties, the fact that hostilities have broken out in the past, recourse to weapons on a sporadic basis is commonplace, forces are deployed, and few of the protagonists an address the issues without resort to rhetoric tinged with hyperbole. This makes for a highly dangerous situation, one which could lead to a serious armed conflict, with profoundly destabilising consequences for the region. So, what is to be done?
As indicted above, there is no shortage of answers, but a distinct paucity of hose which have any chance of success, or which will be seriously considered by the parties. The important question at this point is: what can be done? What is achievable? The answer to this must surely be conditioned by the status quo ante. Whether this is recognised or not, whether it is accepted or not, the issues identified above must condition any response which is to have any chance of avoiding conflict while laying the foundation for a lasting settlement. The international law of the sea can provide some of the answers, but the countries concerned must want to use these rules in this case. Unless they so wish, and so do, then law of the sea - qua law - has little to contribute. At the same time, there must be some attempt to deal with the reality of the South China Sea. The answers to questions such as the extent of hydrocarbon resources do not depend on the will of states, nor are they ultimately matters of opinion, but fact. The fantasy of 'the second Arabian Gulf' ultimately gives way to less exotic but more consequence, such as environmental quality of the waters of the South China Sea, and the threat to the livelihoods of the millions of coastal dwellers posed by coastal state inaction, itself, in part, a result of the dispute. Coastal state cooperation is hardly non-existent in this part of the world, but nor is it sufficient to the needs. How, therefore, can the proponent of such an approach steer clear of the Scylla of lack of official cooperation without falling into the Charibdis of academic and unworkable idealism?
In 1991, Indonesia, with support from Canada, commenced an exercise in informal preventive diplomacy by inviting experts from virtually al countries of the region to a Workshop convened to discuss not jurisdiction, but cooperation in a variety of ocean sectors. Individuals, regardless of their official status in their home countries, would attend in the private capacities. This meeting was successful, and, with major funding from the Canadian International Development Agency, further meetings have taken place with the result that the process established by the South Chin sea informal Working Group has been accepted as one - some would say the only - of the more realistic efforts underway to attempt to avert armed conflict, and substitute close cooperation between the littoral states in the interests of the protection of the South China Sea and the preservation of its resources. That initiative is the subject of this paper.
The South China Sea initiative grew out of long-standing
collaboration between ocean law and policy experts in Canada and
Southeast Asia, led on the Canadian side by Douglas Johnston and
Edgar Gold at Dalhousie University. This leadership culminated in the
establishment of the Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme, which brought
together a unique collection of younger scholars such as David
VanderZwaag, Ted McDorman, the present writer, and others. In time,
many of the principals would depart from the Dalhousie stage, and
DOSP mutated into the Oceans Institute of Canada. The point is,
Canadian participation in the South China Sea venture was facilitated
by DOSP-SE Asian cooperation over a period of some years. The SEAPOL
network, also largely funded by Canada, is another fruit of this
collaboration.
The South China Sea initiative and SEAPOL are funded by the CIDA
through an umbrella project, the Asia-pacific Ocean Cooperation
Programme or APOC. This support is one manifestation of the Canadian
commitment to ocean development issues, especially in the Asia
Pacific. It is fair to say that the South China Sea Informal Working
Group benefits from and could only have been undertaken on the basis
of such a sustained commitment, which has built up so many close
working relationships between Canadians and ocean experts in the Asia
Pacific. There are also contacts and relationships at the official
and military levels. Canada's role in ocean issues - not only through
APOC, but, for instance, the ASEAN-Canada Marine Science initiative,
the ASEAN Post-Harvesting Fisheries Technology project, and programs
in the South Pacific - have very definite foreign policy goals. As
one of the largest coastal states, Canada is very concerned to play a
role in the advancement of, inter alia, policies promoting
conservation and sustainable use, cooperation, and the international
law of the sea. That role is made easier to play by the fact that
Canada comes to certain issues- particularly those of sensitivity or
complexity - without obvious political, strategic or other interests
at stake, nor has Canada any unfortunate history to live down. These
considerations, among others, explain why Canada is the only
non-regional state involved in the South China Sea project.
The South China Sea project came about as a result of conversations
between Ambassador Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia and the present writer
early in 1989. It was the view of Dr. Djalal that the situation in
the South China Sea was increasingly unstable (there ad been violent
clashes between PRC and Vietnamese vessels the year before), and,
unless something was done, violence would erupt once again,
destabilising the entire region. This could hardy be in the interests
of any country, littoral/claimant or not.
The basic elements of the initiative emerged during these conversations. Formal discussions were unlikely to get underway: informal talks on claims were likewise doomed ab initio. But it seemed that informal talks on avenues for cooperation might be a more fruitful goal to pursue. However, such talks had to have a definite and achievable object. These were found in the South China Sea itself, and by reference to the new directions in the law of the sea since UNCLOS III.
The new approaches to the international law of the sea, developed during the eleven years of the meetings of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, crystallised in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. The acceptance of the concept of the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone only served to intensify the situation in areas such as the South China Sea. But the Convention also went some way to overturning the previous assumption that states could do as they please within areas of national jurisdiction in the oceans, and replaced this with the obligation to cooperate where this was functionally necessary. As it turns out, these occasions are many and various, ranging from virtually all aspects of living resource management, marine scientific research and mar environmental protection. Semi-enclosed sea areas such as the South China Sea have a Part of the Convention to themselves, which requires particularly close cooperation in research and environmental protection.
The nature of these obligations have yet to be determined with any precision. It should not be forgotten that, as of February 1995, the Convention has been ratified by Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam in the South China Sea area. These countries are obliged to accept its provisions, and indeed to implement them. Of particular interest in this context are the provisions of the Convention which require cooperation by states of semi-enclosed sea areas in living resource management, conservation, exploration and exploitation, in the protection and preservation of the marine environment, in marine scientific research, and to involve other interested states or international organisations to join in such initiatives, as appropriate. These would appear to apply not only to the South China Sea but also the Gulf of Thailand.
The issue of cooperation was taken up at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development of 1992. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 calls on states to further cooperation by all available means in the interests of the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Although the Law of the Sea Convention is not a treaty in force between each and every South China Sea state, and Agenda 21 is a call for action, as opposed to a set of obligations or rules, their provisions are of considerable importance to initiatives such as APOC. To put the matter simply, not all conventions and declarations are self-executing, and those which contain general principles and attempt to set directions have this character only rarely. They require interpretation, application to specific sites or regions, and implementation. This is all very well, but simply because an ocean makes neighbours of countries, cooperation will not necessarily be easy to achieve. There are many sensitive issues arising here of sovereignty and (sometimes short-sighted) self-interest.
Accordingly, the functional necessity for cooperation, and the need to preserve and protect the South China Sea became the joint cornerstones of the initiative. The goal of the project is the identification of avenues for cooperation and the development of realistic, achievable, and necessary cooperative projects. Disruptive issues, such as the competing claims, are not and cannot be discussed.
The project is administered from Jakarta, Indonesia and Vancouver, Canada. Project activities also take place in all parts of the greater South China Sea area: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Peoples Republic of China, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Taiwan. The Department of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia plays the lading role of any government in the South China Sea region (although it is a South China Sea littoral state, it is not a claimant in the dispute over the Spratly Islands, and therefore 'neutral'). Its participation in the project is mainly in areas of protocol and governmental liaison.
Governments of ASEAN states, Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam participate through a variety of ways, including technical support; acting as host for Technical Working Group meetings; and release of government officials to attend meetings in their private capacities and to prepare papers.
Universities and research agencies in the above countries play a similar role: participation includes technical support; release of personnel to attend meeting in their private capacities and to prepare papers. Private sector participation is limited to release of personnel to attend meetings (the private sector has played a small role to date in this project).
The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada is the executing agency for the project. UBC provides project administration and research services, and also contact with participating governments, government of Canada, other governments, international organisations, regional organisations. Much of the research work is undertaken by a group of researchers in the APOC secretariat, who share with local experts responsibility for rapporteuring meetings, and the production of meeting reports. The writer of this paper is Canadian Project Director.
The Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia is the counterpart to UBC. Its participation includes local administration and liaison of regional governments, other governments, international agencies, regional organisations. The Director of the Centre, Ambassador Hasjim Djalal, is also Project Director.
Classifying or characterising the project is not always easy, since it functions at a number of levels simultaneously. Basically, this is a resource/environmental track-two diplomacy initiative promoting cooperation in ecosystem management and cooperative security in the South China Sea. This is approached through the identification of areas for potential cooperation between the states of the South China Sea region in marine scientific research; marine environmental protection; navigational safety and sea communications; fisheries assessment and management; non-living resource assessment and development; defence and security issues; territorial and jurisdictional issues (other than claims to ocean-space and islands); and institutional mechanisms for cooperation. This is not a 'development' project in the traditional sense, an issue which has provoked some debate within the ranks of our funders, the Canadian International Development Agency!
The objective can therefore be summarised as: the encouragement of confidence building between the states of the South China Sea region, thus easing tensions arising from sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes over the Spratly and Paracel island groups, and ocean space adjacent to the littoral states. Cooperation will be encouraged in such a way as to implement a regime for the South China Sea compatible with the regime for semi-enclosed seas as set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, which serves as a model for project purposes. Such a regime is posited on the cooperation of the littoral states and other states of the region, in the interests of sustainable development and marine environmental protection.
Project outputs are somewhat elusive, and certainly not as dramatic as achieving a 'solution' to 'the' South China Sea problem. The Project will develop proposals for ocean cooperation in the South China Sea, to the point where they can be submitted to international or national funding agencies for support. Proposals will be developed in all sectors identified above. As of January 1995, proposals in biodiversity protection, informatics and data exchange, and the effect of sea-level change in the South China Sea have been developed. The Biodiversity proposal has been circulated to numerous potential funders and discussions with these bodies are underway. Refinement of the other two ideas to the point where they can be submitted for funding should be complete by the end of 1995.
There are of course other potential outputs. The jurisdictional dispute tends to overshadow virtually everything else in the South China Sea: this project seeks to provide fora for the discussion of topics, such as marine environmental cooperation - which are currently ignored, but which should not be. This might lead to cooperation in tackling the environmental problems of the South China Sea, possibly through joint management, cooperation in monitoring, or regional standards-setting and regime-building. There should also be a considerable contribution to the elaboration, interpretation and application of the Convention, especially vis a vis mandated areas of cooperation. It should be noted that the word 'cooperate' is used freely in the treaty: the meaning must obviously change with the context.
The work of the project is advanced largely through meetings, and research projects undertaken in support of these gatherings.
Since 1990, each participating country has been invited to send a number of marine experts to a Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, which is always held in Indonesia. Participants, who attend in their private capacities, are drawn from the ranks of government (mainly departments of foreign affairs, the diplomatic corps, and the military), academia, and research organisations.
Since 1992, the project has spawned Technical Working Groups, on topics such as cooperation in marine scientific research, resource assessment and means of development, marine environmental protection, legal matters, and navigational safety. These meetings of experts produce ideas for cooperation, and refine them to the point where they can be referred back to the annual plenary meetings for adoption, and then either submission to potential funders, or for the governments concerned to meet formally and adopt them.
The advance work for these Technical Working Groups is shared between experts from the regional states, assisted, as necessary, by the project office in Jakarta and Vancouver. Each meeting is rapporteured by local researchers and the Canadian staff, which produces the meeting reports. The intention therefore is to produce concrete ideas for cooperation using track-two or informal diplomacy, with the intention of turning finished ideas over to traditional inter-governmental discussions for final approval. The informal process creates the positive environment in which such cooperation can be envisaged, even with the tense status quo. It is unlikely that any of the matters dealt with by the project could be discussed in formal fora at present.
Other forms of cooperation in the South China Sea may be made possible as a result of the work of this project; the meetings have at least demonstrated some capacity for cooperative dialogue among the littoral states, and the region as a whole. There is also an increasing recognition that the South China Sea ecosystem creates a 'region', which must be the subject of specialised regimes and approaches.
The fact that the South China Sea Informal Working Group refuses to deal in any way with maritime or territorial jurisdictional issues has led to problems of perception, at least in the popular media. All too often, project meetings are discussed in the press as if they were 'about' the Spratly Islands, and failure to resolve this dispute is seen as a failure of the South China Sea Informal Working Group itself. These criticisms are simply ill-founded, but point to the somewhat elusive nature of project work. The informal or 'track-two' approach to problems as complex as those in the South China Sea does not have an extensive history. Perhaps the best example of a more established use of this approach is provided by the history of the PECC Fisheries Task Force.
The informality of both initiatives is both a strength and weakness, although some of the issues in the latter category have more to do with perception than reality. It is perhaps appropriate to consider the track-two approach to maritime diplomacy at this point.
The first point to be made is that, without initiatives such as the South China Sea project and the PECC Fisheries Task Force, it is unlikely that little or any of the work undertaken under their aegis would be going forward. The point is, both were established response to lacunae in the formal sphere: they did not displace or even supplement ongoing inter-governmental activities. Their purpose is to prepare the way for, or facilitate, such activities. Accordingly, each will have a fixed period of usefulness. The length of this period cannot yet be determined.
Second, informal meetings can avoid many, if not all, of the pitfalls and problems of formal, intergovernmental gatherings. In particular, participants have a greater degree of freedom in advancing suggestions and ideas than might otherwise be the case. By and large, a collegiate atmosphere can be established, and junior as well as senior participants feel free to express views. Individuals from the same country have been known to contradict or disagree publicly with one another in South China Sea meetings.
Third, the consensual objectives of the meetings can more easily be met by avoiding any semblance of an adversarial process, although this can arise. Of prime importance here, at least insofar as the work of the South China Sea Informal Working Group is concerned, is the complete avoidance of any topics on which a consensus cannot be reached, or approached. An obvious example is the question of sovereignty over the Spratly Island group, or the matter of conflicting claims to maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea. So far as the South China Sea Informal Working Group is concerned, discussion of these issues is pointless, and indeed dangerous, given the objectives of consensus-building. They are therefore expressly excluded from discussions.
On the debit side, it has been suggested that, because the work of the South China Sea Informal Working Group is informal, and therefore non-binding, it matters less than would the same activities if undertaken formally. This point is answered fully in the previous section: either the work is done informally, or not at all, at least at this point in time. Besides, experience shows that the dividing line between track one and track two diplomacy may be difficult to establish. When a senior government official comes to any meeting and makes a statement on government policy, it must be assumed that this is very much more than a personal opinion, and closer, indeed, to an official pronouncement. Having said this, if such statements were restricted to reiterations of the status quo, then the informal process might not be able to offer more than the formal, apart from the fact that the meeting is taking place at all. But in meetings of the South China Sea Informal Working Group, such officials have, from time to time, quite deliberately, chosen to indicate new positions on the part of their governments, without necessarily claiming full official status for these views. Arguably, this vindicates the informal approach. The criticisms centring on the weight to be given to what takes place can be answered by reference to the status of the participant making a particular statement.
The issue of the relationship - if any - between an informal initiative and the formal sphere is bound to arise sooner or later. It might be claimed that the PECC Fisheries Task Force faces what looks very like direct competition from the Living Resources Working Group of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation initiative (APEC). Arguably, the implementation and expansion of APEC suggests that the time of the PECC itself may have come. However, despite the clamour of publicity surrounding APEC, it should not be forgotten that this is a formal process, and subject to all the limitations, as well as advantages, appertaining thereto. Given the achievements of the PECC Fisheries Task Force, it might be argued that, it is for those who wish to concentrate attention on APEC and its working groups to prove that this is an efficacious approach at the present time. There is only one way to do this: by results. To date, at least insofar as fisheries cooperation is concerned, no results have been identified. Furthermore, APEC membership does not include all states involved with PECC.
So far as the South China Sea Informal Working Group is concerned, opinions differ as to how far and how fast the formal track should supersede the informal. In his opening remarks at the project Workshops of 1994 and 1995, Foreign Minister Alatas has called on participants to give this matter their best attention. The work of the South China Sea Informal Working Group itself is, after all, a prelude to formal discussions. However, it seems that the measured pace of progress from track two to track one is to the overall liking of Workshop participants.
Second, it could be argued that countries are willing to participate in an informal process merely to perpetuate the appearance of reasonableness, without the need to engage in follow-up activities. In the case of the PECC Fisheries Task Force, this criticism has little weight, since there is plenty of evidence which tends to the contrary, As regards the work of the South China Sea Informal Working Group, it is perhaps too soon to tell. The overall point, insofar as it identifies a concern, remains valid. It is important to assess the progress of the projects in determining the extent of validity here.
This project depends on the central role of Ambassador Hasjim Djalal, not only as co-director and co-chair of meetings, but also as a diplomat of international standing, law of the sea expert, and senior regional authority on these matters. The support of the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Minister Alatas has been crucial in giving a certain tone to otherwise informal proceedings. Without Ambassador Djalal, or leadership from another individual of undisputed authority and expertise, the work of the South China Sea Informal Working Group would likely be of little consequence, if it was able to proceed at all.
It was the decision of Ambassador Djalal to model the conduct meetings of the South China Sea Informal Working Group on United Nations meetings, such as those which formed part of the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and the Preparatory Commission on the Law of the Sea. Since most of the participants are senior officials, the meeting environment is one which is familiar to them. The 'academic' or 'conference' approach is avoided as much as possible.
The project has devoted a considerable amount of time (and budget) to the production of meeting Reports. These comprise an account of each session, produced by a team of rapporteurs, papers presented or otherwise made available, meeting information (agenda, participants), and other relevant documents. These Reports constitute the record of the work of the project. This has obvious external implications, in providing information for non-participants, governments, and others. It has internal significance also, since there will, in the course of things, be some changes in personnel from meeting to meeting. Newcomers often have to be reminded that some issues, far from being taboo, have actually been discussed and dealt with before, and so can be brought up again. Utmost case must be taken to ensure the production of a comprehensive and accurate report for each meeting.
The work of the South China Sea Informal Working Group grew from the jurisdictional dispute, with its attendant dangers of military conflict and regional instability. However, it was important to identify a functional objective for the project which would serve as justification for a series of meetings which so obviously avoided the major South China Sea issues. The major functional theme is the need for cooperation by co-littorals, especially those sharing a semi-enclosed sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 has been ratified by four regional state: Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Viet Nam. However, the framework regime for semi-enclosed seas contained therein, Article 124, serves as a indicator of the likely minimum obligations for the littoral states. This question will be discussed more fully at the first meeting of the Technical Working Group on Legal Matters, scheduled for the summer of 1995. The point here is that a viable focus for project activities must be found: mere references to cooperation are unlikely to sustain a prolonged effort.
The outputs of project activities appear elusive. This is perhaps the nature of the beast: it cannot be seriously expected that a relatively few meeting can produce much in the way of substance given the intractable nature of the dispute. However, the 'Manila Declaration' on the South China Sea, which figured prominently in the 1995 dispute between the PRC and the Philippines over Mischief Reef began life at the 1991 Bandung Workshop. This is one example of an informal output becoming formalised. As a general point, expectations must be tempered by reality and an appreciation of what is achievable. Similarly, project meeting agendas are designed to avoid topics on which progress is unlikely to be made, and proposals which are governed by idealism rather than achievability are likely to be given short shrift. This is not to say that proceedings are timid and proposals conservative - far from it. It is simply that grand designs for joint development of petroleum resources belong, at this point, in the conference hall and learned periodical, not the agenda of the meetings of the South Chin Sea Informal Working Group.
It might be asked: what would the project directors have done differently if they were starting afresh? This question is very hypothetical: the project is still in its early stages, and inefficient practices have been modified. The Project Directors consider that they have made a promising start: no more.
The work of the PECC Fisheries Task Force to date suggests that, with the appropriate approach, obstacles to functionally-dictated ocean cooperation can be overcome. In the South China Sea, the problems are obviously more clearly etched than, for instance, in the South Pacific, or Pacific Latin America. However, the work of the South China Sea Informal Working Group, while admittedly in it early stages, shows that previously taboo subjects can also be discussed, if the approach is appropriate, and focused on some generally agreed and functional goal.
APOC is an experiment in the coordination of sectoral policy-oriented programmes of a unique nature. The components were brought together initially out of convenience. However, strategic integration has started to occur, assisted by the momentum generated by the successful execution of activities. However, the full potential of initiatives such as APOC requires sponsors and beneficiaries alike to consider how far the mandate of the project should extend. In the case of APOC, this is still happening. The process is one of considering further options for integration within the APOC mandate, and between this and other projects, ranging, for instance, from the Canada-ASEAN Marine Science initiative to cooperative security ventures through networks such as CANCAPS. Thus, integration is not necessarily confined to activities funded by one country, but is essentially sectoral. Not all (national) funding agencies look at such ideas with favour, but their objections rarely have anything to do with functional issues.
The activities of the South China Sea Informal Working Group and the PECC Fisheries Task Force indicate that there is a role for track-two diplomacy in matters which are very sensitive, and not perhaps amenable to formal, inter-governmental approaches. In the paper, certain pre-conditions for a successful venture have been noted. An overly academic approach is to be avoided, and it is essentially to focus on what is achievable at any given time. Commentators are apt to dismiss agreements to hold technical meetings as some sort of failure, or, at best, an achievement of the second rank. These views are short sighted. Technical cooperation provides a considerable foundation for more complex arrangements: the latter can hardly ever occur in the absence of the former. Similarly, personalities are important. Individuals with authority must be involved at all points.
It is the writer's view that academics and researchers have potentially vital - but not exclusive - role to play in the initiation of project such as the South China Sea Informal Working Group. However, as anyone conversant with Universities will know, professors are not always - or even sometimes - natural diplomats. The South China Sea Project would be nowhere without Ambassador Djalal for a range of reasons, not least is his skill as a negotiator. This being said, those who have developed a speciality in, for instance, marine affairs, should welcome the opportunity to apply their knowledge in the interests of the furtherance of ocean governance and management. The results of a conference may 'rub off' on government officials: with track-two initiatives, the impact is more direct, and no-one is required to surrender their impartiality or make similar compromises. Obviously, a South China Sea project meeting takes place with more constraints than, say, the annual meeting of the Law of the Sea Institute. This seems a small price to pay for participation in a forum which has a better-defined and beneficial purpose.
Other skills are brought to bear: South China Sea project meeting Reports are produced by the Vancouver project office: rapporteurs are Research Associates of the Project, and have a key role in the design and refinement of the cooperative projects which are the end-result of the initiative. They also produce some of the advance documents for meetings, provide information, and liaise continually with those involved with the project in the region and elsewhere. Such skills are found in universities and research institutes, not necessarily in government.
The 'middle power' issue has many aspects, but only two seem relevant here. Canada is not a major power, but this enables it to play its current role in the South China Sea process. It poses no threat, and has no vital interests at stake. This cannot be said of countries such as Japan and the United States. Australia, though it would be more compromised in the South China Sea than is Canada, also has the ability to 'punch above its weight', and would be well qualified to play a leading role in an informal or semi-formal initiative of the South China Sea type. Furthermore, Australia has a unique perspective on two aspects of cooperation: Antarctica, and the Timor Gap joint development arrangement with Indonesia. This perspective would be most valuable in the South China Sea context, and might provide Australians with a point of entry into the initiative as its activities continue to proliferate.